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I. Introduction 
Throughout history abortion has been a divisive and controversial issue. Since the Supreme 
Court seized abortion jurisprudence in Roe v. Wade, the case that held that a woman’s right to an 
abortion fell within the Fourteenth Amendment’s right to privacy, pro-choice and pro-life 
proponents have fought vigorously for what they believe to be right. 1 As a result, states have 
struggled to take back some of that regulatory power. The Supreme Court’s decision in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, which reaffirmed Roe but created a new 
standard allowing further regulation of abortions, opened the floodgates to state over-regulation, 
ranging from regulating the doctor, the facility, the procedure, and the woman herself.2  
In 1989 members of Congress determined that enough was enough, and responded by 
creating the Freedom of Choice Act in order to protect the reproductive rights of women. 3 Their 
intent was to codify Roe and reduce government interference with a woman’s right to choose. 
The Freedom of Choice Act would have had the effect of eradicating decades of state and federal 
legislation and Court precedent. Unfortunately, the bill never got off the ground. 
Without the Freedom of Choice Act there is a gaping hole in our federal legislation that 
needs to be occupied by a bipartisan bill that would protects women’s reproductive rights. For 
too long states have had a stranglehold on abortion law, it is time that women take back their 
rights from the state by asking Congress to enact legislation that will protect their interests in 
liberty, privacy, and equality.  
                                                 
1 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 142, 93 S. Ct. 705, 721, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973). 
2 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674 
(1992). 
3 See The Freedom of Choice Act, H.R. 3700, 101st Cong. (1989); S. 1912, 101st Cong. (1989). 
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Part II of this paper will discuss the historical background of abortion jurisprudence and its 
evolution beginning with Roe v. Wade and ending with Gonzalez v. Carhart. It will discuss the 
strong protections the Roe Court provided to women and the process through which the Court 
slowly chipped away at those protections over the last four decades. Part II will conclude that, 
with the Court’s holding in Gonzalez the floodgates had been opened, and legislators nationwide 
have debated, and largely enacted regulatory measures that have strongly curtailed a woman’s 
ability to procure an abortion in many jurisdictions.  
Part III will present examples of the overbreadth of legislation that has resulted from the 
Court’s decision to move away from the vigorous protections of strict scrutiny and into the realm 
of the undue burden test. Specifically, it will address the most common forms of abortion 
regulation and the dangerous effects they can have on women seeking abortions. Part III will 
focus on the restrictive and coercive measures used in some states to drastically reduce the 
number of abortions provided while not completely eliminating them, under a strategy 
commonly referred to as the “incrementalist approach.” This section will contend that these laws 
do not exist for the purpose of protecting the pregnant woman and the fetus, as many of their 
proponents assert, but to propagate political and religious ideology to the detriment of a woman’s 
right to privacy.  
Part IV will discuss the Freedom of Choice Act, a piece of federal legislation that could 
have ended the abortion debate once and for all. However, since the Freedom of Choice Act was 
never enacted, this paper proposes an alternative solution that might bring both sides together, in 
order to end the continual onslaught of abortion legislation proliferated by the states. This section 
argues that this country, politically, religiously, and mentally, is ready to make concessio ns on 
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both sides of argument and proposes a model federal statute that would take abortion legislation 
out of the hands of the state.  
Ultimately, this paper concludes that the states have abused their autonomy and drastically 
reduced women’s constitutional right to privacy, resulting in the need for a federal law outlining 
a woman’s right to obtain an abortion without state interference.  
II. Historical Background 
This part describes the evolution of abortion jurisprudence and how it has shaped the 
legal landscape of abortion law as we know it today. While the United States initially derived its 
abortion law from English common law, the states quickly began developing their own laws and 
by the early 1970’s the Supreme Court, in Roe v. Wade, was ready to weigh in on the subject. 
Abortion jurisprudence has changed drastically since the decision Roe and this section tracks 
those changes and the effects they have had.  
 Historically, the legal status of abortion took shape under English common law, whereby 
abortions performed prior to “quickening”4 were legal.5 This principle continued to prevail until 
the mid-1800s when Connecticut created a law targeting apothecaries who sold poison as a 
method of abortion.6 New York followed, becoming the first state to enact legislation making 
abortion itself a criminal offense, barring destruction of unquickened and quick fetuses, when 
performed at any point during the pregnancy, unless necessary to preserve the life of the mother.7  
The American Medical Association further contributed to the states criminalization of 
abortion when it adopted resolutions protesting “against such unwarrantable destruction of 
                                                 
4 Quickening is defined as the first fetal movements perceptible to the mother. Mark S. Scott, Quickening in the 
Common Law: The Legal Precedent Roe Attempted and Failed to Use , 1 MICH. L. & POL'Y REV. 199 (1996). 
5 Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1261 (24th ed. 1965). 
6 Conn. Stat. tit. 20, § 14 (1821). 
7 N.Y. Rev. Stat., pt. 4, c. 1 tit. 2, Art. 1, § 9, p. 661, and tit. 6, § 21, p. 694 (1829). 
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human life” in 1857.8 This created a domino effect and by the turn of the century almost every 
state had a similar or more restrictive law in place. 9 State abortion laws continued to be enacted 
and by the early 1960’s all states prohibited abortions to some degree, however only 
Pennsylvania prohibited abortions under any circumstance. Forty-four states permitted abortions 
only when then woman’s life would be jeopardized if the pregnancy were carried to term.10 Four 
states and the District of Columbia permitted abortions if the woman’s life or physical health 
were in jeopardy, and Mississippi was the only state that permitted abortions in the case of 
rape.11 
 Despite these laws prohibiting abortions, absent exceptional circumstances, women 
continued to obtain abortions.12 Women attempted to perform abortions on themselves or sought 
out the assistance of unlicensed practitioners or skilled physicians if they had the means. 13 As a 
result of the laws enacted by many states, and recognition that illegal abortions were continuing 
to take place and were often dangerous14, the American Law Institute (ALI) called for national 
change in its Model Penal Code (MPC) of 1962. While the ALI proposed that an abortion should 
be considered a felony when “unjustified,” it added that "[a] licensed physician is justified in 
terminating a pregnancy if he believes there is a substantial risk that continuance of the 
pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or mental health of the mother or that the child 
                                                 
8 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 142, 93 S. Ct. 705, 721, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973). 
9 See Quay, Justifiable Abortion-Medical and Legal Foundations, (pt. 2), 49 GEO.L.J. 395, 406-422 (1961), a 
compilation of abortion statutes prior to 1960.  
10 See Rachel Benson Gold, Lessons from Before Roe: Will Past be Prologue? , THE GUTTMACHER REPORT ON PUB. 
POL'Y, Mar. 2003, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/06/1/gr060108.pdf. 
11 See Benson Gold, supra note 10, at 9. 
12 Between 1950 and 1960 it is estimated that 200,000 to 1.2 million illegal abortions were performed. See Lynn M. 
Paltrow, Executive Director, National Advocates for Pregnant Women, Testimony Before the Task Force: Sept. 22, 
2005, http:// www.advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/articles/so_dak_tf.htm. 
13 See Leslie Reagan, Victim or Accomplice? :Crime, Medical Malpractice, and the Construction of the Aborting 
Women in American Case Law, 1860s-1970, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 311, 318 (2001). 
14 Prior to the legalization of abortion, illegal abortions were the cause of approximately 5,000 deaths per year. See 
Richard Schwarz, SEPTIC ABORTION (1968) (citing to Frederick J. Taussig, Abortion, Spontaneous and Induced: 
Medical and Social Aspects (1936) which discusses the mathematical formula used to determine that between 8,000 
– 10,000 women died each year as a result of illegal abortions).  
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would be born with grave physical or mental defect, or that the pregnancy resulted from rape, 
incest, or other felonious intercourse."15 Since nearly all states prohibited abortions, aside from 
when the woman’s health was at risk, the MPC attempted to broaden what was consider justified 
by making exceptions not only for physical and mental health of the mother, but also for birth 
defects, and pregnancy resulting from rape and incest.  
 States began to model their abortion laws after the MPC, beginning with Colorado’s 
liberalizing law in 1967.16 Other states followed Colorado’s lead and by 1972, thirteen states had 
statutes that mirrored the MPC. The ALI also influenced New York, Washington, Hawaii, and 
Alaska, which repealed their anti-abortion laws entirely. By the time the Supreme Court decided 
Roe in 1973, all but five states had introduced abortion reform legislation.17 
A. Roe v. Wade 
Over the past forty-two years the Supreme Court has been the leading force in shaping 
abortion policy by handing down decision after decision beginning with Roe v. Wade18, while 
effectively usurping the issue from the states. 
 Roe v. Wade was the first case to address a woman’s right to choose an abortion prior to 
fetal viability under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 19 In 1973, in Roe the 
Court addressed the constitutionality of a Texas statute that criminalized abortions except with 
respect to abortions procured for the purpose of saving the life of the mother. 20  The Court 
                                                 
15 MODEL PENAL CODE: Offenses Against the Family § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
16 See Claire Martin, Colorado Abortion Rights Got Start 40 Years Ago Today , THE DENVER POST , available at 
http://www.denverpost.com/ci_5743173. 
17 Benson Gold, supra note 10, at 9. 
18 See 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
19 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 170, 93 S. Ct. 705, 735, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973)  
20 Id. at 118. 
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simultaneously addressed the constitutionality of a Georgia statute that also criminalized 
abortion in Roe’s companion case, Doe v. Bolton.21  
 The pregnant plaintiff Jane Roe sought an order declaring that the Texas statute 
prohibiting her from procuring an abortion unless her life was in danger violated the Due Process 
Clause. 22 She further sought an injunction restraining Texas from enforcing the statute. 23 The 
trial court found that the statute violated the Ninth through the Fourteenth Amendments24 and 
concluded all individuals have a fundamental right to choose where to have children. While the 
District Court found that the Texas statute was unconstitutionally vague and thus facially void, it 
declined to issue an injunction, as the court felt abstention25 was warranted. The plaintiffs Roe 
and Doe appealed to the Supreme Court.   
 The Court reviewed the meaning of the word “person” as it is construed in the 
Constitution, as the appellees argued that a states desire to recognize prenatal life constituted a 
compelling state interest.26 The Court ruled that “person” only applies to individuals postnatally 
and has no application prenatally, as the word as contained in the Fourteenth Amendment does 
not encompass the unborn. 27  The Court acknowledged that if personhood were established 
prenatally, the case for legalized abortion collapses. 28 However, since the Court ruled that the 
                                                 
21 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 93 S. Ct. 739, 742, 35 L. Ed. 2d 201 (1973). 
22 Roe, 410 U.S. at 120. 
23 Id.  
24 The Ninth Amendment states that “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to 
deny or disparage others retained by the people.” U.S. Const. amend. IX. The Fourteenth Amendment states in 
relevant part that “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 
25 The doctrine of abstention is a judge-made doctrine first contrived in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman 
Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941), whereby federal courts can avoid needless conflict with state courts by choosing not 
to hear a case or a portion thereof where there exists unresolved questions of both state law and the constitution.  
26 Roe, 410 U.S. at 156. 
27 Id. at 158. 
28 Id. at 157. 
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unborn child does not qualify as a person under the Fourteenth Amendment, he therefore has no 
rights.29 Therefore, the only right that remains would be the mother’s right to privacy.30  
 The Supreme Court determined that while there exists a definitive right of privacy under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, that right is not absolute. 31 At some point during the pregnancy a 
state’s interests may become sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation, specifically, when 
necessary to safeguard health, maintain medical standards, and protect potential life.32   
 Although the Court has generally analyzed fundamental rights through the lens of strict 
scrutiny 33 , in Roe, the Court created a three-tiered framework, whereby as the pregnancy 
progressed state interest grew and increased regulation was permitted. The Court established that 
after viability, approximately the end of the first trimester, the state might then regulate the 
abortion to the extent that the regulation “reasonably relates” to the preservation of the life and 
health of the mother.34 The health of the mother encompasses her physical well being, as well as 
her psychological well-being. 35  Accordingly in Doe v. Bolton, the Court concluded that the 
‘medical judgment may be exercised in the light of all factors - physical, emotional, 
psychological, familial, and the woman's age—relevant to the well-being of the patient.’36 These 
factors, consequently, became the criteria with which abortions became permissibly sanctioned. 
 In sum, the Court in Roe held that the right to privacy includes a woman’s right to 
terminate a pregnancy prior to fetal viability. The Court did not follow the approach generally 
applied when a fundamental right is at issue and instead created a three-tiered legal framework, 
                                                 
29 Id. at 158. 
30 Id. at 159. 
31 Id. at 154. 
32 Id. at 154. 
33 Strict scrutiny is a mode of judicial review first articulated in United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 
152 n.4 (1938), whereby there exists a compelling state interest behind the challenged policy, and that law is 
narrowly tailored to achieve its result.  
34 Id. at 164. 
35 Id. at 153. 
36 410 U.S. at 192. 
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based on the nine months of pregnancy, which gave the state greater interest and regulatory 
freedom in each successive tier.  
B. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 
It was not until many years later that the Court once again argued the veracity of Roe in 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.37 Another divided court, comprised 
of plurality Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter, authored an opinion reaffirming the 
essential holding in Roe v. Wade, with Justices Blackmun and Stevens concurring. However, the 
three pluralists were joined by the Court’s conservative wing of Justices  – Rehnquist, Scalia, 
White and Thomas – in upholding all of the Pennsylvania’s statutes requirements, aside from the 
spousal notification provision.  
At issue in Casey were five provisions of a wide-ranging Pennsylvania abortion law that 
included an informed consent requirement, a twenty-four hour waiting period for women who 
sought abortions, as well as a provision that married women must notify their husbands prior to 
undergoing an abortion.38 Plaintiffs, five abortion clinics and a physician representing himself as 
well as a class of physicians who performed abortions, brought suit challenging the statutes 
constitutionality and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.39  
The trial court found every provision of the statute at issue unconstitutional and granted 
the injunction.40 However, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding 
that all provisions, aside from the spousal notification provision, were constitutional. 41  The 
plaintiffs petitioned the Court for review and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.42 
                                                 
37 See 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
38 Id.  
39 Id. at 845. 
40 Id.  
41 Id. 
42 A losing party has the ability to petition the Supreme Court to review the decision of a lower court by way of a 
petition for Writ of Certiorari. U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 10, 28 U.S.C.A. (West 2015).  
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The plurality, Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter, found that Roe’s essential 
holding, the right of a woman to have an abortion prior to viability and the state’s ability to 
regulate after the point of viability, should remain in place.43  While the plurality admitted that 
Roe’s ruling has “engendered opposition,” they found that it is by no means unworkable.44 
However, the plurality went on to reject Roe’s rigid trimester framework in favor of giving states 
more discretion to restrict access to abortions as well as extending protections for fetal life, as 
long as those regulations did not create an “undue burden” on abortion rights pre-viability.45 The 
Justices defined an “undue burden” as “a state regulation [that] has the purpose or effect of 
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”46 
Therefore, it is constitutional for a state to take measures to ensure that a woman’s free choice to 
obtain an abortion is informed, as long it does not hinder that right.47 
The majority further expounded, that after viability the state could “proscribe abortion 
except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or 
health of the mother.” 48  Based on this consideration, the plurality upheld the majority of 
Pennsylvania’s statute, including the requirements for informed consent,49 a twenty-four hour 
waiting period,50 parental consent for a minor,51 and record keeping and reporting to the state.52 
The only provision of the Pennsylvania law that the plurality found troublesome, and deemed 
                                                 
43 Id. at 846. 
44 Id. at 855. 
45 Id. at 872-76. 
46 Id. at 877. 
47 Id. at 877-79. 
48 Id. at 879. 
49 Id. at 873. 
50 Id. at 885-87. 
51 Id. at 899. 
52 Id. at 900-01. 
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unconstitutional for causing an undue burden on the right to abortion prior to viability, was the 
spousal notification provision.53 
Generally speaking, the plurality acted as peacemaker in many ways by accommodating 
both sides of the Roe debate. Their opinion allowed pro-life activists more room to regulate 
abortion while still maintaining and some ways further defining a woman’s freedom to choose. 
However, the opinion also succeeded in creating more questions by stepping away from strict 
scrutiny and into the realm of the “undue burden” test.  
While many abortion opponents believed that Casey would finally be the case to overturn 
Roe, its reaffirmation only served to solidify its legal precedence. As a result, state politicians 
who opposed abortions began to escalate their assault against Roe and Casey by enacting laws 
that dealt with how abortions were performed instead of the general legality of abortions 
themselves. 54 By creating bans against partial birth abortions, politicians could legally side step 
Casey, as no undue burden was placed on the right to abortion.55 
C. Gonzalez v. Carhart 
Following Stenberg v. Carhart56 , in which the Supreme Court held that a Nebraska 
statute banning partial birth abortions lacked the requisite exception for “preservation of the … 
health of the mother,”57 Congress passed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act (2003) (“The Act”) 
                                                 
53 Id. at 898. 
54 Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Constitutionalizing Roe, Casey and Carhart: A Legislative Due-Process Anti-
Discrimination Principle That Gives Constitutional Content to the "Undue Burden" Standard of Review Applied to 
Abortion Control Legislation , 10 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 211, 264 (2001). 
55 James Bopp, Jr. & Curtis R. Cook, Partial-Birth Abortion: The Final Frontier of Abortion Jurisprudence , 14 
ISSUES IN L. & MED. 3 (1998) 
56 See 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
57 Id. at 930-31. While the majority in Stenberg seemed to continue to toe the line between those in favor and those 
against abortion, they appeared hesitant to commit to the idea of fetal “life.” (In notes the majority describes the 
abortion procedures in ways that could appear “clinically cold or callous” to some readers, not necessarily 
embracing the fetus as a life but being sympathetic to those that do). However, Justice Kennedy, dissenting, believed 
that “the life that the fetus embodies possesses a “sanctity” and “although there are those who will be “insensitive, 
even disdainful,” to it, the fetus is nevertheless entitled to “dignity and respect.””  See Khiara M. Bridges, "Life" in 
the Balance: Judicial Review of Abortion Regulations, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1285, 1306 (2013). Justice Kennedy 
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to “proscribe a particular method of ending fetal life in the later stages of pregnancy. ”58 The Act 
chose not to accept the District Court’s factual findings and instead focused on the “moral, 
medical, and ethical consensus” that partial birth abortions were inhumane and never medically 
necessary, thereby prohibiting the procedure.59 
The plaintiffs, four physicians who performed second-trimester abortions, challenged the 
Act’s constitutionality as being void for vagueness and an undue burden on the rights of pregnant 
women seeking abortions.60 The trial court granted a permanent injunction, which prohibited the 
Attorney General from enforcing the Act except under circumstance where there was no debate 
that the fetus was viable.61 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court and the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.62 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, upheld the federal ban finding that the 
respondents had not been able to demonstrate that the act was void for vagueness, or “that it 
imposed an undue burden on a woman’s right to abortion based on its overbreadth or lack of a 
health exception.”63  
The majority applied the standards found within Casey, even going as far as applying the 
dicta on viability 64 , even though agreement had not been reached on that point. 65  Justice 
                                                                                                                                                             
would go on to convince four other Justices to take this point of view of “life” in Gonzalez v. Carhart (also known 
as Carhart II). See 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
58 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 124, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1614, 167 L. Ed. 2d 480 (2007). 
59 Id. at 124. 
60 Id. at 133. 
61 Id. 
62 Id.  
63 Id. at 168. 
64 The Casey opinion contained this summary: “It must be stated at the outset and with clarity that Roe's essential 
holding, the holding we reaffirm, has three parts. First is a recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have 
an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State. Before viability, the State's 
interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the 
woman's effective right to elect the procedure. Second is a confirmation of the State's power to restrict abortions 
after fetal viability, if the law contains exceptions for pregnancies which endanger the woman's life or health. And 
third is the principle that the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health 
of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child. These principles do not contradict one another; and 
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Kennedy, true to his Stenberg dissent 66 , noted that the Act applied both previability and 
postviability because “by common understanding and scientific terminology, a fetus is a living 
organism while within the womb, whether or not it is viable outside the womb.”67 Despite the 
obvious conflict with Roe previablity, the majority held that the statute was constitutional based 
on the notion that it did not place any undue burden on those abortions.68 
The majority spent a good portion of their opinion differentiating Nebraska’s 
unconstitutional statute from the federal ban. 69  Even though Justice Kennedy dissented in 
Stenberg, the majority did not overturn the court’s opinion, they managed to fit the federal ban 
within its parameters. 70  More importantly, the Court announced the death of the “physician 
veto,71” shifting the focus from woman’s physical health to their mental health, while entirely 
eliminating physician autonomy. Justice Kennedy focused his opinion on the state’s interest, 
specifically regarding the “grave decision” that woman faced when considering an abortion.72 
The majority noted that “[it] is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to abort 
                                                                                                                                                             
we adhere to each.” Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey , 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992). 
65 Id. at 145. 
66 See footnote 57.  
67 Id. at 147. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 141-147, 149-156. 
70 The majority provided several examples throughout the opinion. (1) The majority noted that the federal ban used 
language that alleviated the issues found within the Nebraska statute, specifically when it came to vagueness. (2) 
They further noted that the ban’s scienter requirement all but alleviated any vagueness as it narrowly tailored the 
prohibition. (3) Furthermore, the majority found that the ban assiduously worked to depart from the issues present in 
the Nebraska statute by adopting the phrase “delivers a living fetus,” as opposed to “delivering…an unborn child, or 
a substantial portion thereof. Thereby alleviating any confusion as to what procedure was specifically banned.  (4) 
The identification of specific landmarks also differed from the Nebraska statute, as there could no longer be any 
confusion when it came to what was considered a “substantial portion” of the fetus. (5) Additionally, Congress also 
differentiated itself from the statute by including an “overt act” requirement.  
71 “This veto can be globally defined as the placing of dispositive weight in our nation's abortion jurisprudence on 
the autonomy and judgment of physicians who favor abortion rights, at the expense of undergoing the more difficult 
and deeper process of engaging issues of women's liberty and equality vis -à-vis the nature of the unborn fetus and of 
abortion itself.” Peter M. Ladwein, Discerning the Meaning of Gonzales v. Carhart: The End of the Physician Veto 
and the Resulting Change in Abortion Jurisprudence ., 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1847 (2008). 
72 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007). 
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must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound when she learns, only after 
the event,” exactly how the procedure took place.73  
The Court abolished the one true exception safeguarding women’s health, the physician 
veto, in favor of the states interest in promoting fetal life.74 Justice Ginsburg, dissenting, had 
some very harsh words for the majority. She noted from the outset that the Casey Court “stated 
with unmistakable clarity that state regulation of access to abortion procedures, even after 
viability, must protect “the health of the woman.”” 75  She further reiterated that the Stenberg 
Court continued with this line of thinking when holding the Nebraska partial-birth abortion 
statute unconstitutional.76  
Justice Ginsburg lambasted the Gonzalez Court for finding the ban constitutional in the 
wake of the American College of Obstetrics finding the procedure necessary and proper under 
certain circumstances. 77  Additionally, she derided the Court for relying on the congressional 
findings, which the District Court found fault with, for not carefully considering the evidence 
prior to reaching their conclusions.78 She noted that several of the physicians who testified before 
Congress did not perform abortions at all and Congress put too much weight in their opinions, 
and not enough in the opinions of physicians with actual abortion experience.79 
 Furthermore, the dissent averred that the federal ban “scarcely further[ed]” the state’s 
interest in “preserving and protecting fetal life” because the law focused on a method of abortion, 
thus not saving a “single fetus from destruction.”80 The dissent continued its criticism of the 
majority for allowing “moral concerns” to override fundamental rights and “dishonor [the 
                                                 
73 Id. at 160. 
74 Id. at 170-71 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
75 Id. at 170 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey , 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992). 
76 Id. at 170.  
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 175. 
79 Id.  
80 Id. at 181. 
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Court’s] precedent.”81 Thus, concluding that the majority’s own personal beliefs took priority 
over the health and autonomous choice women previously held, while reiterating long displaced 
notions about women’s place in society.82  
 In summation the Supreme Court, beginning with Roe took a very strong position with 
regards to a woman’s right to an abortion, however, with each successive case the Court chipped 
away at those rights. The Court’s decision in Gonzalez was viewed as a major triumph for 
defenders of fetal life and created ripples throughout the states, as one after another began 
restricting the rights of pregnant woman.  
III. The Abortion Fallout 
 The anti-abortion rights movement, since the decision in Roe v. Wade, has taken an 
incrementalist approach to chipping away at the right to abortion. The incremental approach 
relies on “the cumulative effect of restrictions short of bans and extralegal pressures to restrict 
the provision of abortion services and create ‘abortion- free’ states without criminalization.”83 
The result of this strategy has been a literal explosion of state and federal restrictions on 
abortions, especially following the decision in Gonzalez v. Carhart.84 
 This section will examine the different means utilized by the anti-abortion movement in 
an attempt to undermine Roe and its progeny in an effort to make obtaining an abortion as 
burdensome as possible for those who need them the most.  
A. Personhood Statutes 
                                                 
81 Id. at 182.  
82 Id. at 185.  
83 Linda J. Wharton & Kathryn Kolbert, Preserving Roe v. Wade . . . When You Win Only Half the Loaf, 24 STAN. L. 
& POL'Y REV. 143, 156 (2013) (quoting Dawn Johnsen, “TRAP” ing Roe in Indiana and a Common-Ground 
Alternative, 118 YALE L.J. 1356, 1360 (2009) (citing Memorandum from James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, on 
Pro-Life Strategy Issues (Aug. 7, 2007)). 
84 Wharton & Kolbert, supra note 83, at 156. 
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Personhood statutes aim to make all abortions illegal by establishing fertilized eggs as 
persons.85 Given the rise in support for severe abortion measures86 , surprisingly recent ballot 
initiatives have failed at the state level, and thus far no personhood legislation has passed.87  
The idea of personhood statutes, while currently garnering attention, has been around 
since the time of Roe.88  Following Roe, opponents of abortion tried tirelessly to amend the 
Constitution to include the Human Rights Amendment, without success. 89  Through the 
incremental approach, the movement for fetal personhood was revived, and since 2008 ballot 
initiatives have popped up across the county. This movement has been largely led by Keith 
Mason, president and founder of Personhood USA, a religious pro-life group.90 Keith Mason and 
Personhood USA have assisted with personhood measures in many states, and several other 
states have taken it upon themselves to introduce legislation.91 In 2015 alone, personhood bills 
                                                 
85 Maya Manian, Lessons from Personhood's Defeat: Abortion Restrictions and Side Effects on Women's Health , 74 
OHIO ST . L.J. 75, 76 (2013). 
86 Recently states including, Alabama, Arizona, Kansas, and Texas have imposed severe restrictions on a woman’s 
ability to undergo an abortion. The governor of Arizona signed a bill on March 30, 2015, that requires physicians to 
inform women undergoing a drug-induced abortion that the abortion can be “reversed” mid -procedure, even though 
that statement is unsupported by medical evidence. 2015 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch. 87 (S.B. 1318). Last year Alabama 
enacted a law that requires minors who wish to have an abortion but do not have parental consent to undergo a trial 
and gives judges the discretion to appoint a guardian ad litem for the interests of the unborn child. Ala.Code § 26-
21-4(j) (Westlaw). Kansas has become the first state to ban “dilation and evacuation” procedures, a common 
second-trimester method of performing abortions and considered one of the safest abortion procedures. Unborn 
Child Protection from Dismemberment Abortion Act of 2015, S.B. 95, Kan. Eighty-Sixth Legis. (2015). In 2013 
Texas enacted sweeping abortion legislation, including banning abortions after 20 weeks, restrictions on medicinal 
abortions, and severe TRAP laws, which have had the effect of shuttering half of Texas’ abortion clinics during that 
same year. Tex. Health & Safety Code § 171.044, § 171.063, and § 171.0031. 
87 See Laura Basset, Colorado And North Dakota Voters Reject Fetal Personhood Measures , THE HUFFINGTON 
POST , (Nov.  4, 2014) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/04/personhood-colorado_n_6104120.html. 
88 Maya Manian, supra note 85, at 78. 
89 Glen A. Halva-Neubauer & Sara L. Zeigler, Promoting Fetal Personhood: The Rhetorical and Legislative 
Strategies of the Pro-Life Movement After Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 22 FEMINIST FORMATIONS 101, 102-03 
(2010). 
90 PERSONHOOD USA, http://www.personhoodusa.com/about-us/leadership/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2015). 
91 Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Mississippi, Montana, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Rhode Island, Virginia, 
Washington and Wisconsin. See Personhood’ Legislation Dealt Another Blow, This Time in Iowa , RH Reality 
Check, http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2015/03/10/personhood-legislation-dealt-another-blow-time-iowa/ (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2015) (listing states and the status of their legislative initiatives). See also: Parents Against 
Personhood, Legislation, http://parentsagainstpersonhood.com/legislation/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2015) (listing states 
who have initiated personhood bill/initiatives and the outcomes). 
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have been introduced in six states: Montana, Mississippi, New Hampshire, South Carolina, 
Virginia, and Washington.92 
Overwhelmingly, voters have rejected personhood legislation in every state in which it 
made the ballot. One commentator has argued that “the uniform failure in the push for zygote 
personhood appears rooted, at least in part, in reproductive rights advocates' success in linking 
personhood proposals to health issues other than abortion for which the public has much more 
sympathy.”93 In reality, it was not support for abortion, but the slew of unintended consequences 
to women’s health involving contraception, intro vitro fertilization, and general pregnancy care, 
that flow from personhood legislation that have seemed to spell its demise.94 However, states 
continue to introduce personhood legislation in hopes of swaying their constituencies. 
B. TRAP laws 
Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, also known as “TRAP” laws, regulate clinics 
in order to restrict access to abortion.95 Unlike personhood laws, anti-abortion proponents have 
had a lot of success implementing these statutes across the county. 96 While the laws differ from 
state to state, most requirements apply the states’ standards for an ambulatory surgical ce nter to 
                                                 
92 See Personhood Bills and Ballot Initiatives, Resolve: The Nat'l Infertility Ass'n, http://www.resolve.org/get -
involved/personhood-bills-and-ballot-initiatives.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2015) (listing states and the status of their 
legislative initiatives). See H.R. 1309, 2015 Leg., 130th Sess. (Miss. 2015); H.R. 425, 2015 Leg., 64th Sess. (Mont. 
2015); H.R. 194, 164th Gen. Ct. Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2015); S. 129, 121st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2015); H.R. 
1687, 2015 Leg., 64th Sess. (Wash. 2015).  
93 Maya Manian, supra note 85, at 86. 
94 Maya Manian, supra note 85, at 87-100. 
95 State Policies in Brief: Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, THE GUTTMACHER INST ., 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_TRAP.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2015). (24 states have laws or 
policies that regulate abortion providers and go beyond what is necessary to ensure patients’ safety; all app ly to 
clinics that perform surgical abortion). 
96 See Ala. Admin. Code r. 420-5-1-.04 (2013); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 36-449.03 (2012); Conn. Agencies Regs. § 19-13-
D54 (2005); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 390.014(1) (2008); 210 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 5/2-5/6.6 (2012); Ind. Code Ann. § 
16-34-2-4.5 (2014); Kan. Admin. Regs. §§ 28-34-127 (c)(1), 28-34-132(2011);  902 Ky. Admin. Regs. 20:360 
(2015); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 40:2175.2-4 (2001); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.20115(2013); Miss. Code Ann. § 
41-75-1(f)(2012); Mo. Ann. Stat.  § 188.080 (West 2005); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-45.1(a) (West 2013); Ohio 
Admin. Code § 3701-83-19(E) (2011); Okl. St. Ann. tit. 63 § 1-737 (West 1978); 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 448.806 
(West 2014); R.I. Admin. Code 31-1-2:3.0 (West 2015); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-41-75 (1995); S.D. Codified Laws § 
34-23A-51 (2015); Utah Code Ann. § 26-21-6.5 (West 2011); 12 Va. Admin. Code § 5-412-370 (2014). 
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abortion clinics, even though the procedures performed at a surgical center tend to be far more 
invasive and risky.97 These laws also typically require clinics to maintain a relationship with a 
hospital, which doesn’t concern the health and safety of the patients, but gives hospitals veto 
power over the very existence of the clinic. 98  Lastly, and most critical, some laws require 
abortion clinicians to have privileges at a local hospital, which has proven extremely difficult 
even impossible in some states, like Mississippi.99 
The public rationale in many states for having TRAP laws are the health and safety of the 
women visiting these clinics, however some states have been more candid, admitting the purpose 
of the law is to “protect the unborn.” 100   These laws are having the effect anti-abortion 
proponents hoped they would, restricting access to abortions by setting an inordinately high 
standard for abortion clinics, thereby causing many to shutter their doors, leaving pregnant 
women with little in the way of alternatives.101 
C. Compulsory Ultrasounds  
While Gonzalez v. Carhart considered the way abortion procedures were performed, the 
Court still managed to address the issue of informed consent, though it wasn’t necessarily the 
issue that it was in prior abortion cases.102 The majority in Gonzalez not only spoke to the issue 
                                                 
97 The Guttmacher Institute, supra note 95. (22 states require facilities where abortion services are provided to meet 
standards intended for ambulatory surgical centers). 
98 Id. (7 states require each abortion facility to have an agreement with a local hospital in order to transfer patients in 
the event complications arise. (Including requirements on clinicians a total of 21 states require a provider to have a 
relationship with a hospital). 
99 Id. (14 states require abortion providers to have some affiliation with a local hospital. 5 states require that 
providers have admitting privileges. 9 states require providers  to have either admitting privileges or an alternative 
arrangement, such as an agreement with another physician who has admitting privileges). 
100 Rachel Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, TRAP Laws Gain Political Traction While Abortion Clinics – And the 
Women They Serve – Pay the Price, GUTTMACHER POLICY REVIEW (Spring 2013), 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/16/2/gpr160207.pdf (citing Sutton J and Watkins T, Mississippi legislature 
tightens restrictions on abortion providers, CNN (Apr. 5, 2012), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/04/politics/mississippi-abortion/). 
101 Benson Gold & Nash, supra note 100, at 10. 
102 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (“The State has an interest in ensuring so grave a choice is 
well informed.”). 
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of informed consent, but also expanded Casey’s reading of informed consent.103 The majority 
noted a District Court decision in which most of the doctors stated that they do not tell their 
patients the specifics of the abortion procedure, which they found to be problematic, and a 
legitimate concern to the state.104 In dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued that banning the procedure 
was not the answer, providing the women with complete and accurate information was. She 
further noted that there was no logical connection between a woman’s mental health and banning 
the D & X.105 
As a result of the Court’s expansion in Gonzalez, states took it upon themselves to 
expand their informed consent laws, adding a compulsory ultrasound component. A survey of 
state ultrasound measures reveals that they can be divided into two groups based on their 
requirements. The first and more prevalent group requires that a pregnant woman contemplating 
an abortion be given the option to see an ultrasound prior to giving her consent to the 
procedure.106 Furthermore, the woman has the option of refusing the ultrasound and still having 
the procedure done. Group two is slightly more restrictive, requiring doctors to perform an 
ultrasound and offering to show the patient that ultrasound prior to an abortion.107 While there is 
some variation regarding the timing of the ultrasound in these states, the ultrasound is no longer 
an option that can be bypassed.  
Although the first group only requires an offer, and is not burdensome, the second group 
requires that the physician perform an invasive procedure prior to obtaining consent. While laws 
                                                 
103 See above, Justice Kennedy’s comments regarding the “grave decision” women face and the regret they may 
come to feel, therefore informed consent is necessary from the outset.  
104 Gonzalez, 550 U.S. 124,159 (citing Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 466 (S.D.N.Y., 
2004)). 
105 Id. at 182.  
106 Ark. Code Ann. § 20-16-602(a) (LexisNexis 2004); Ga. Code Ann. § 31-9A-3(4) (2006 & Supp. 2008); Idaho 
Code Ann. § 18-609(3) (2004 & Supp. 2008); Ind. Code Ann. § 16-34-2-1.1(b) (West 2006); Mich. Comp. Laws § 
333.17015(8) (West 2006); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-41-330(A)(1) (2002 & Supp. 2007). 
107 Ala. Code § 26-23A-4(b)(4) (LexisNexis 2006); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 390.012(3)(d)(4) (West 2008); La. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 40:1299.35.2(C) (2008); Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-34(1) (West Supp. 2007). 
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such as these are unlikely to dissuade someone seeking an abortion from following through, it is 
just one of many barriers in these states placed in the way of pregnant women.  
D. Fetal Pain Laws 
Commonly titled “Woman’s Right to Know Acts,” fetal pain laws abandon informed 
consent – whereby physicians provide crucial information to patients based on their medical 
discretion – in favor of statutory instructions disseminating particular facts to pat ients that may 
or may not be medically accurate.108 The science involving fetal pain is highly complex and 
exceedingly contested109, however, that has not stopped twelve states from enacting fetal pain 
laws. 110  These states – Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma and Texas – have prohibited abortions at twenty 
weeks, sometimes even earlier, based on the theory that a fetus can experience pain from that 
point on.111 Additionally, many of these statutes, if not all of them, contain requirements that the 
pregnant woman be provided information which includes the following statement: 
By 20 weeks' gestation, the unborn child has the physical 
structures necessary to experience pain. There is evidence that by 
20 weeks' gestation unborn children seek to evade certain stimuli 
in a manner which in an infant or an adult would be interpreted to 
be a response to pain. Anesthesia is routinely administered to 
unborn children who are 20 weeks' gestational age or o lder who 
undergo prenatal surgery.112 
 
                                                 
108 See Ga. Code Ann. § 31-9A-4(a)(3) (2006); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.35.6(C)(1)(a)(ii) (2001); Kan. Stat. 
Ann. § 65-6709 (2013); see also Ark. Code Ann. § 20-16-1105(a)(1)(A) (2005); 63 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 1-738.10(A) 
(2006).  
109 Pam Belluck, Complex Science at Issue in Politics of Fetal Pain , N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 16, 2013), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/17/health/complex-science-at-issue-in-politics-of-fetal-pain.html?_r=0 
110 The Guttmacher Institute, State Policies in Brief: State Policies on Later Abortions, GUTTMACHER.ORG, 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_PLTA.pdf 
111 Pam Belluck, supra note 109. 
112 Ark. Code § 20-16-1105(a)(1)(A) (2005); Ga. Code § 31-9A-4(a)(3) (2006); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-
6710(a)(2)(2009).Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 63 § 1-738.10(A) (Supp. 2008); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
40:1299.35.6(C)(1)(a)(ii) (2001).  
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Supporters of the fetal pain laws have strongly relied on the findings of Dr. Kanwaljeet 
Anand, a professor of pediatrics, anesthesiology and neurobiology at the University of 
Tennessee’s Health Science Center. Dr. Anand has stated that he believes fetal pain is likely 
between eighteen and twenty-four weeks, however, he noted that fetal pain is unlikely to be 
applicable to abortion, as most abortions are done before the fetus is capable of experiencing 
pain. 113  Dr. Anand’s work has been cited as least four times on the House floor during 
Congressional debate over a potential national twenty-week ban on abortion.114 However, Dr. 
Anand does not wish to be associated with the anti-abortion movement, which he believes has 
gotten out of control, and now declines to participate in legislative debate.115 
Conversely, The UK College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists has found in a study 
released in 2010, that most neuroscientists believed that in order to perceive pain the cor tex must 
be developed, which does not occur prior to twenty-four weeks.  Therefore, many of the laws 
promulgated by the states are entirely unnecessary and misplaced, as the report concludes that 
fetuses are unable to feel pain at the time of abortions.116 
In 2013, the American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, wrote an open letter 
to Texas legislators titled Get Out of Our Exam Rooms, in which they firmly stated that: “Recent 
and rigorous scientific reviews have concluded that there is no evidence of fetal perception of 
pain until 29 weeks at the earliest (third trimester is 28–40 weeks).”117  They argue that the 
                                                 
113 Pam Belluck, supra note 109.  
114 Kate Sheppard, Fetuses Feel Pain at 20 Weeks, and 4 Other Abortion Myths, MOTHER JONES (Jun. 20, 2013, at 
6:50 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/06/science-house-abortion-ban-fetal-pain. 
115 Tara Culp-Ressler, Scientists Studying ‘Fetal Pain’ Don’t Actually Want Their Research to Justify Abortion 
Bans, THINK PROGRESS, (Sept. 17, 2013, at 11:46 AM), 
http://thinkprogress.org/health/2013/09/17/2633271/scientists-fetal-pain/. 
116 Andy Coghlan, 24-week Fetuses Cannot Feel Pain , NEW SCIENTIST (June 25, 2010 at 1:04 PM), 
http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn19089-24week-fetuses-cannot-feel-pain.html#.VQrqR0Kp3dl.  
117 American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Open Letter to Texas Legislators: Get Out of Our Exam 
Rooms (July 9, 2013), http://www.acog.org/About-ACOG/News-Room/News-Releases/2013/Open-Letter-to-Texas-
Legislators 
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requirements that Texas wishes to impose on women, physicians, and abortion facilities runs 
counter to science and in contravention to the health and safety of patients.118 
Fetal pain laws are just another impediment to obtaining an abortion, and do not exist to 
further the health of the mother but to force political and religious ideology on the women 
seeking them.  
E. Other Laws 
While listed above are some of the most pervasive and restrictive regulations states have 
imposed, that list is far from exhaustive. State and federal legislation has reduced access to 
abortion in a variety of ways, including reducing or eliminating funding for abortion services119, 
banning later abortions 120 , imposing parental consent laws 121 , controlling information 
surrounding abortion care 122 , and imposing waiting periods. 123  For a survey of some of the 
country’s harshest regulations see note 86.  
F. Why These Laws Exist 
The majority of the laws restricting abortion, if not all of them, exist purely based on the 
religious and political leanings of the politicians who propagate them. 124 These laws rarely have 
                                                 
118 American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologist 
 
s, supra note 117. 
119 One example of this type of regulation, is found in West Virginia, whereby Medicaid funds are prohibited from 
being used to fund abortions unless required by a medical emergency. W. Va. Code Ann. § 9-2-11 (West 1993).  
120 See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 171.044 (2013), which provides that a person may not perform an abortion 
once it is determined that the “unborn child” is 20 or more weeks old.  
121 One example is Indiana’s requirement that a minor obtain written consent from a parent prior to undergoing the 
abortion. Ind. Code Ann. § 16-34-2-4. 
122 South Dakota requires that a woman be informed of the possible side effects of having an abortion, including: 
depression and psychological distress, increased risk of suicidal ideations, the rate of death as a result of having an 
abortion, and other health risks such as hemorrhage, infection, and infertility. S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-10.1 
(2014). 
123 See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-202 (2012), which provides that after being informed of the required information, a 
woman must wait two days prior to undergoing the procedure.  
124 Tara Culp-Ressler, Abortion Laws are Expected to get Even Worse in the New Year, THINK PROGRESS, (Dec. 10, 
2014, at 4:05 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/health/2014/12/10/3601930/abortion-laws-tighten-2015/. 
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any scientific backing and are mainly part of the incrementalist plan to slowly restrict abortions 
to the point where they are no longer available at all.125 
IV. Privacy and Autonomy for Women, Not States 
A woman’s right to privacy should come before and supersede a states right to be 
autonomous. As promulgated in Roe, women should have a fundamental right to privacy that 
encompasses the right to have an abortion without state interference. That dream almost came to 
fruition with the Freedom of Choice Act, however, the bill was never passed and states have 
continued to enact restrictive abortion legislation. This section proposes a solution similar to the 
Freedom of Choice Act but which contains concessions to both sides of the abortion debate. The 
religious, political, and general population of Americans seems ripe for this type of legislation. It 
is possible to end the debate once and for all and return the right of privacy to women, with 
whom it belongs.  
A. The Dream 
In 1989 the Freedom of Choice Act (FOCA or the Act) was introduced and then most 
recently re- introduced again in 2007 with very few changes. However, since that time the politics 
have not aligned, and the Act has been shelved. 126 The legislation would have codified Roe, 
thereby legalizing abortion and preventing the government, at any level, from interfering with a 
woman’s ability to procure an abortion.127  
The original 1989 version of FOCA, permitted the states to regulate a woman’s right to 
abortion postviability as long as her health was not at risk, but protected that right by prohibiting 
                                                 
125 See Fetal Pain Laws; Arizona’s new law requiring doctors to inform patients of reversing medicinal abortions in 
note 86; TRAP laws which perpetuate the lie that abortions are unsafe and require and massive regulation; laws 
requiring women be informed of the mental health consequences of having an abortion, even though there is no 
medical backing for this assertion.   
126 See The Freedom of Choice Act, H.R. 3700, 101st Cong. (1989); S. 1912, 101st Cong. (1989). 
127 Congress Introduces Bill Aimed at Legalizing Women's Right to Choose, 13 ANDREWS HEALTH L. LITIG. REP. 2 
(2006). 
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state interference prior to viability, as established in Roe.128 Additionally, the bill contained a 
provision that allowed states to implement measures that were necessary to protect a woman’s 
life and health, however, this “medical necessity” provision was absent is later ite rations of the 
Act.129   
The next iteration of the Act in 1993, while following the same platform of protecting the 
reproductive rights of women, provided some insight into the motivations for creating the Act.130 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision to modify the strict scrutiny standard utilized in Roe to 
Casey’s undue burden standard, the sponsor’s felt FOCA was now more necessary than ever.131 
The sponsors found that as a result of the deviation in standard, some states had begun to restrict 
the right of women to procure abortions. The sponsors enumerated several consequences as a 
result, including: a higher percentage of illegal abortions, a burden to interstate commerce, 
discrimination, and interference with the ability of medical professionals to provide health 
services.132 
Furthermore, the Act reiterated its sponsor’s desire to reinstate the strict scrutiny standard 
utilized in Roe. 133  However, FOCA included a so-called “safe harbor” provision which, 
specifically stated:  
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to (1) prevent a State 
from protecting unwilling individuals or private health care 
institutions from having to participate in the performance of 
abortions to which they are conscientiously opposed; (2) prevent a 
State from declining to pay for the performance of abortions; or (3) 
prevent a State from requiring a minor to involve a parent, 
                                                 
128 Kristen L. Burge, When It Rains, It Pours: A Comprehensive Analysis of the Freedom of Choice Act and Its 
Potential Fallout on Abortion Jurisprudence and Legislation , 40 CUMB. L. REV. 181, 184 (2010).  
129 Id.; see H.R. 1964, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1173, 110th Cong. (2007). 
130 H.R. 1068, 103d Cong. (1993); S. 25, 103d Cong. (1993). 
131 Id. 
132 Id. § 2(a)(2). 
133 Id. § 2(b). 
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guardian, or other responsible adult before terminating a 
pregnancy.134 
These provisions allowed legislation that states had enacted post-Roe, under the authority 
of Roe, to stand. FOCA's supporters stressed that these provisions assured that “protecting the 
interest of a woman's right to choose would not be at the expense of a state's interest in 
protecting potential life.”135 
Notably, this safe harbor provision was absent in the 2007 iteration of the Act.136 The 
2007 version of FOCA made a few other notable changes. First, the Act altered some of the 
language pertaining to how states may or may not regulate. In the prior versions the act dictated 
that a state “may not restrict the freedom of a woman to choose,”137 however, the most recent 
amalgamation stated that a state shall not “deny or interfere with a woman's right to choose.”138 
Moreover, the authors added a “statement of policy” of the United States, which specified “that 
every woman has the fundamental right to choose to bear a child, to terminate a pregnancy prior 
to fetal viability, or to terminate a pregnancy after fetal viability when necessary to protect the 
life or health of the woman.”139 Lastly, the bill now contained a private civil cause of action for 
violations of the Act 140 , and was retroactive to “every Federal, State and local 
                                                 
134 Id. § 3(b)(1-3). 
135 Kristen L. Burge, supra note 128 (citing 136 Cong. Rec. S7836 (daily ed. June 12, 1990) (statement of Sen. Max 
Baucus). Senator Baucus asserted that 
the Freedom of Choice Act would continue to permit such laws[,] [e.g. parental consent]. It is likely ... that the 
courts would interpret the otherwise unexplicated language of the [Act], if enacted, in a way as to make it 
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alternative bypass.). 
136 See H.R. 1964, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1173, 110th Cong. (2007). 
137 H.R. 1068, 103d Cong. (1993); S. 25, 103d Cong. (1993) 
138 H.R. 1964; S. 1173; see supra note 136, § 4(b)(1). 
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statute…regulation,…decision…or other action enacted, adopted, or implemented before, on, or 
after the date of enactment….” of the Act.141 
Before the 108th Congress, Senator Barbara Boxer proclaimed that “[w]omen's 
reproductive rights [were] rapidly eroding as a result of the unrelenting efforts of the Bush 
Administration, the Republican Caucus, and powerful anti-choice organizations.” 142 
Unfortunately, even though President Barack Obama vowed to sign the Freedom of Choice Act 
the minute he became president, that never came to fruition, as it was no longer his “highest 
legislative priority.”143 The bill was last introduced in 2007 and has been scarcely mentioned 
since dying in the 109th Congress.144  
What was once a very promising bill for many women no longer has the opportunity or 
support to make its way through Congress given the political make-up of the House of 
Representatives.  
B. The Reality  
After the Freedom of Choice Act failed to gain traction, little hope remained for a similar 
bill to be passed. However, this paper proposes that instead of a law that would completely 
satisfy pro-choice or pro-life proponents, a bipartisan bill that would remove the power from the 
states and eliminate the questions that surround abortion law and jurisprudence.  
i. The General Public 
                                                 
141 Id. § 6. 
142 Barbara Boxer, Press Release, (Jan. 22, 2004), https://www.boxer.senate.gov/press/release/boxer-introduces-
legislation-to-codify-roe-v-wade-on-the-31st-anniversary-of-the-decision/. 
143 Molly Moorehead, Nothing to Sign; Bill has Fizzled , POLITIFACT (June 1, 2012, 7:01 AM), 
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A recent study revealed that while abortion still remains a divisive issue in the United 
States, the public generally supports a “middle-ground” approach.145 It comes as no surprise that 
liberals are most likely to favor no restrictions on abortion, with 88% believing there should only 
be restrictions in certain situations, and 43% believing there should be no restrictions at all. It 
also comes as no surprise that 21% of consistently conservative individuals believe that abortions 
should be entirely illegal, however, 73% of consistently conservative individuals believe 
abortions should be allowed under some circumstances. 146 Interestingly, these numbers “reflect 
the fact that conservatives are less likely to oppose legal abortions than liberals are to support it.” 
ii. The Religious Sector 
While it is exceedingly common for opinions regarding abortions to be correlated with 
ideology, over the past several years there has been a noticeable shift in the role it plays 
politically.  
Following Roe v. Wade, the Roman Catholic Church and the majority of evangelicals 
consistently came to oppose abortion.147 In principle both the Catholic Church and evangelicals 
believe that all life is sacred from conception until death, thereby condemning the practice of 
abortion.148 Conversely, mainline Protestants were found to be the least likely to find abortion to 
be morally wrong, even though the clergy themselves are practically evenly split on the issue.149  
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Statistically, two-thirds of white evangelical Protestants (66%) currently express support 
for having churches speak out on political and social issues. 150  With nearly six- in-ten black 
Protestants (58%) also agreeing; as do approximately half of white mainline Protestants (49%) 
and Catholics (48%).151 Unsurprisingly, most individuals who have no religious affiliation say 
churches and other houses of worship should stay out of politics (65%), with just 32% saying 
churches should speak out on political matters.152 
While interest groups both for an against abortions firmly control political candidates and 
presidential hopefuls, the American people, whether religious or secular, still grapple with the 
issue of separation of church and state,153 which has resulted in a better opportunity for bipartisan 
abortion legislation. A recent survey found that Americans are now equally divided on the 
question of “whether churches and other houses of worship should express their views on day-to-
day social and political questions.”154 Approximately three quarters (72%) of Americans think 
that religion is losing influence on American life, though the majority of these individuals 
believe this is a bad thing. However, when it comes to the issue of abortion and religion, 55% of 
Americans believe it should be legal, with four in ten believing it should be illegal.155 
 Predictably, among those in the Republican Party, nearly six in ten (59%) believe that 
churches should have a voice concerning both political and social issues. 156 Juxtapose that with 
the Democratic Party who is more evenly split on the issue, with 42% believing churches should 
express their political views, with 55% believing churches should stay out of politics. 157 When it 
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comes to endorsing candidates, the majority of Democrats and Republicans agree that it should 
not be allowed, and the majority of major religious groups all subscribe to this line of thinking.158 
 It appears that, religion aside, Americans are more open to abortion legislation that would 
take into consideration to both sides of the argument. While many Christians firmly believe that 
abortion is abhorrent, Christians are ready to concede there should be criminal sanctions for the 
procedure, which could result in a hazardous black market for abortions, putting both the fetus 
and mother at risk. It is not impossible for other parties to follow suit and replace the inflexible 
structure that confines the abortion argument. So while the majority of American’s believe that 
abortion should be legal in all situations, there is no reason to believe that they would oppose 
legislation that provided some concessions to those on the opposite side of the argument and vice 
versa. 
iii. The Political Sphere 
Abortion plays an important role in politics, as it has the power to win seats in the House, 
the Senate, and the oval office. Specifically, in 2008, President Obama ran on the platform that 
he would sign the Freedom of Choice Act the minute he got into office, which unfortunately 
never came to fruition. Additionally, in 2012 there were more than forty Republicans running for 
the House and Senate who wanted to ban abortion access  to women, even those who had been 
victims of rape and incest.159 Voters opposed to abortion view it as a much more important issue 
than those who support it.160 
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While we already know that most Democrats (65%) believe abortion should be legal in all 
or most cases and Republicans (57%) believe it should be illegal in all or most cases, there do 
exist some nuances. 161  Neither party can agree when it comes to the degree of legality or 
illegality.162 Statistically, while there will always be far right and far left leaning individuals, 
currently there exist enough Democrats and Republicans to possibly compromise on an abortion 
solution.  
iv. A Possible Solution 
Proponents of the ultra-restrictive laws found in the conservative, pro- life jurisdictions 
ignore the woman’s body in abortion and focus instead on the “rights and interests” of the fetus. 
Legislation and jurisprudence need to return to focusing on the physical health of the pregnant 
woman: not her mental, health nor the health of the fetus, but the woman herself.  She is not 
merely a vessel from which life is brought; she is an individual with fundamental rights that have 
been abrogated by religion and politics. One solution is to craft a piece of legislation that brings 
the focus back on women’s health and makes concessions on both sides of the argument. While 
the Freedom of Choice Act was the preeminent piece of abortion legislation for pro-choice 
proponents, it is just not feasible in the current political climate.   
 An alternative to FOCA is sustainable, however, given the overall tenor of popular 
opinion regarding female reproductive choice in this country. That is, while religious 
conservatism actively combats the principle rule in Roe, most Americans agree with women’s 
choice, albeit to varying degrees. This paper urges both sides to set aside their respective 
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ideological agendas and establish a compromise. Elected officials give voice to American values, 
and the majority of Americans have decided abortion should be legal but regulated. Congress 
should enact a federal bill that codifies Roe to the extent that the law balances women’s right to 
pre-viability abortion with the states’ interest in potential life. The law should take a step back 
from strict scrutiny, as it did in Casey, and continue but refine its undue burden test while 
accounting for the diversity in existing state laws and looking at the actual impact of those laws 
on the women they are targeting. It would not be difficult to gage the burden that some of these 
women are facing, especially in states like Mississippi and South Dakota where access to 
abortions has been virtually eradicated. Furthermore, the law would protect the privacy, liberty, 
and equality of the women seeking abortions, by returning the right to make intimate decisions 
without state interference.  
 The bill should also contain provisions for regulating abortions. One such provision 
would establish the number of per capita, per jurisdiction abortion clinics, and require states to 
have a reasonable minimum number of facilities available to adequately serve its distinct 
communities. Another balancing feature of the bill would retain waiting periods as long as they 
do not exceed forty-eight hours, enough time for a woman to consider her decision, but not 
excessively “burdensome.” Additionally, states could retain the right to have physicians obtain 
privileges or have the hospital be associated with the clinic, so long as those privileges and 
associations are reasonably obtainable and not impossible, as is now the case in some outwardly 
pro-life states. 
 There are a number of ways that the legislation could be written to bring both sides 
together if they are so willing. This paper proposes that Congress should enact the following or 
similar legislation: 
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Section 1. Interference with Reproductive Health Prohibited 
A state may not restrict the right of a woman to choose to 
terminate a pregnancy: (1) before fetal viability; or (2) at any time, 
if such termination is necessary to protect the life or health of the 
woman. 
Section 2. State Regulation  
A state may: 
(A) regulate a hospital, clinic, or other health facility, where 
abortions take place to the degree that other outpatient 
facilities are regulated; 
(B) require a physician performing abortions to obtain privileges 
or require the facility to be associated with a hospital in the 
case of emergency; 
1. a hospital may not refuse association or privileges 
based on reasons other than religious affiliation. 
(C) require waiting periods, as long as those waiting periods do 
not exceed forty-eight hours. 
Section 3. Placement 
There shall exist abortions clinic in every state based on population 
and area. There shall be no less than two clinics per state.  
While this statute is in no way complete, it provides a genesis from which to begin. The 
legislation would eliminate the nonsensical nature of current abortion law in favor of clear and 
concise boundaries. States would retain some autonomy, by being allowed to determine the 
degree to which they regulate abortion, but their autonomy would exist within the confines of the 
statute. There has to be an end in sight, we cannot continue to allow states to abrogate women’s 
reproductive rights until there is nothing left.    
While it could be argued that states are autonomous for a reason – in order to limit the 
power of the federal government163 – state autonomy should not supersede the constitutional 
rights of its constituents. Historically, states have used their autonomy to “protect and press their 
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interests and to influence the content of policy at the national level” through the usage of 
political parties.164 But at what point have states gone too far? By over-regulating abortion - to 
the point of nearly eliminating the possibility of having an abortion in some states – states have 
exceeded the limits of their autonomy and offended the constitutional rights of their female 
constituents.  
State autonomy does not justify the violation of constitutional rights. Women have a 
fundamental right to privacy and this should never be supplanted by the political or ideological 
orientation. Furthermore, states have continuously abused their powers when it comes to abortion 
rights, which is precisely why a bipartisan bill seizing this power from them is imperative.  
A woman’s right to terminate pregnancy is rooted in her constitutional rights to due process 
and privacy, and this right should not be affected by the personal tastes of her state’s lawmakers. 
A bill ensuring the fundamental right to have an abortion is both necessary and possible at this 
time in our country.  
V. Conclusion 
As the abortion issue continues to divide constituencies along social, religious, and political 
lines, there remains room for cooperation and consideration for a federal law that would end the 
debate once and for all. While partisanship has stalled FOCA, this paper offers a compromise 
that both preserves female reproductive choice and maintains baseline autonomy for states.   
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